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NSC BRIEFING

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10 March 1954

## THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION

### I. Complex Maneuvering Continues

Restoration all Nagib's former offices following 12 days of behind-scene maneuvering emphasizes continuing political instability in Egypt as forces demanding parliamentary government clash with authoritarian Revolutionary Command Council. Now all give lip service to restoring constitutional government by 23 July 1954 -- Second anniversary of coup deposing Farouk --  RCC strongly opposed any change likely to lessen its control.

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### II. Position of Revolutionary Command Council

A. Announcement of elections for Constituent Assembly and restoration Nagib represent strategic retreat by Nasr-dominated RCC in face of:

1. Nagib's popularity and animosity to members RCC.
2. Increasing popular discontent over autocratic rule by inexperienced young officers.

3. Widespread demand for return to parliamentary government.

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B. RCC not likely to relinquish any authority to forth-coming  
Constituent Assembly unless developing situation forces it  
to do so. If Assembly is elected, likely to be confined  
to merely writing of constitution.

25X1 C. [ ] RCC hopes to avoid elections by  
creating political situation providing occasion for RCC to  
take over government again on absolute basis.

25X1 D. [ ] continuing friction between Nagib and  
Nasr supporters and RCC's intention to undermine and  
discredit Nagib.

### III. Position of Nagib

A. Nagib apparently still possesses no decisive authority  
despite return to former posts: president; prime minister;  
president of RCC.

1. Unlikely he will be satisfied former ineffectual role.

New demands for increased authority will be continuing  
source friction with RCC.

2. Apparently intends to strengthen position by supporting

return to parliamentary life.  
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3.  symbol of "New Egypt." Could

become rallying point opposition groups.

#### IV. Future Outlook

- A. Continued RCC maneuvers to satisfy demands for parliamentary government without actual loss of control. Public sympathy RCC reported all-time low and Nagib's initial burst of extreme popularity already declining result his obvious subservience to RCC.
- B. Prospects for development of genuine parliamentary government very uncertain.
1. Army clique has few friends and little experience.
  2. Wafd and Moslem Brotherhood organizations in one guise or other likely to move into strong opposition.
  3. Leftist elements expected merely to associate themselves to anti-Western maneuvers; no real threat at present.
- C. Possibility dissident army factions e.g. Cavalry officers may challenge RCC with new coup.

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